Aviation Risk Lab
Most accident analysis stops at "pilot error." Aviation Risk Lab goes further.
Real accidents don't have single causes. They emerge quietly — from the way systems interact, decisions compound, and conditions align. Understanding that is what separates reactive safety from genuinely resilient operations.
This is a space to think carefully about how risk actually behaves in aviation — through case studies, system-level analysis, and frameworks grounded in real practice. Written by a practising aviation safety engineer, for professionals, pilots, and students who want to go beyond the surface.
Latest
Aloha Airlines Flight 243 (1988) When inspection systems assume continuity in a structure that no longer has it
Korean Air Cargo Flight 6316 When ground handling and system assumptions collapsed in sequence
Überlingen Mid-Air Collision (2002) When two systems trusted the same idea of separation
Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 When attention became the system’s weakest component
China Airlines Flight 006 When automation silently removed the aircraft from stable reality
Aloha Airlines Flight 243 (1988) When inspection systems assume continuity in a structure that no longer has it
The Event
On 28 April 1988, Aloha Airlines Flight 243, a Boeing 737, was cruising between Hawaiian...
Korean Air Cargo Flight 6316 When ground handling and system assumptions collapsed in sequence
The Event
On 15 April 1999, Korean Air Cargo Flight 6316, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11, departed Shanghai...
Überlingen Mid-Air Collision (2002) When two systems trusted the same idea of separation
The Event
On 1 July 2002, two aircraft were flying in controlled European airspace:
Bashkirian Airlines...
Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 When attention became the system’s weakest component
The Event
On 29 December 1972, Eastern Air Lines Flight 401, a Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, was on approach...
China Airlines Flight 006 When automation silently removed the aircraft from stable reality
The Event
On 19 February 1985, China Airlines Flight 006, a Boeing 747, was cruising at high altitude...
Asiana Airlines Flight 214 When the system was flying correctly, but the understanding of the system was not
The Event
On 6 July 2013, Asiana Airlines Flight 214, a Boeing 777, was on final approach to San Francisco...
Lufthansa Flight 2904 When braking distance was a system assumption, not a guaranteed reality
The Event
On 14 September 1993, Lufthansa Flight 2904, a Boeing 737, landed at Warsaw’s Okęcie Airport...
Air Canada Flight 143 (Gimli Glider) When a system ran out of fuel it was told it had plenty of
The Event
On 23 July 1983, Air Canada Flight 143, a Boeing 767, departed Montreal for Edmonton.
Mid-flight,...
Helios Airways Flight 522 When the system never knew it was already dying
The Event
On 14 August 2005, Helios Airways Flight 522 departed Cyprus bound for Prague with a scheduled...
Air Inter Flight 148 When the interface made two different actions look the same
The Event
On 20 January 1992, an Airbus A320 operated by Air Inter was descending toward Strasbourg...
Qantas Flight 72 When the system reacted correctly to something that wasn’t real
The Event
On 7 October 2008, an Airbus A330 operating as Qantas Flight 72 was cruising at 37,000 feet...
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 Accident Analysis: Automation Dependency and Radio Altimeter Failure
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 demonstrated how small technical faults can rapidly propagate through tightly...
British Airways Flight 38 Accident Analysis: Engine Icing and the Limits of Automation
British Airways Flight 38 is often described as a landing accident caused by a sudden loss of engine...
United Airlines Flight 232: Controlling the Uncontrollable
United Airlines Flight 232 is one of the most studied aviation accidents in history—not because of how...
Colgan Air Flight 3407: Fatigue, Training, and System Pressure
Colgan Air Flight 3407 is often summarised as a pilot error accident.
But that explanation is incomplete.
This...
Qantas Flight 32: When Systems Prevented Catastrophe
Qantas Flight 32 is often described as a “successful emergency landing.”
But that description undersells...
Air Transat 236: The Flight That Shouldn’t Have Turned Around
There are certain aviation events that feel almost implausible when you first hear them, not because...
The Columbia Accident: When Uncertainty Becomes the Decision
Some accidents are caused by failures.
Others are caused by something more subtle:
uncertainty that...
Uber Autonomous Crash: Seeing vs Understanding
This is not an aviation accident case, but it is closely related to autonomous aviation systems and the...
Mid-Air Collision Over Washington DC: When Shared Airspace Becomes a System of Assumptions
Some accidents don’t feel like a single-point failure.
They feel more like a system quietly doing what...
Swissair Flight 111: Electrical Coupling and Thermal Propagation
Summary
Swissair Flight 111 wasn’t brought down by a single failure. What really happened was more subtle—and...
Japan Airlines Flight 123: Structural Fatigue and Systemic Maintenance Drift
Summary
Japan Airlines Flight 123 is often described as a structural failure—and that’s true—but that...
Tenerife Airport Disaster: Communication Breakdown in High-Density Systems
Summary
The Tenerife Airport Disaster is often talked about as a miscommunication event, but that really...
Boeing 737 MAX: A System-Level Analysis of MCAS, Organisational Design, and Safety Assumptions
Summary
The Boeing 737 MAX accidents weren’t caused by a single failure, or one obvious mistake.
They...
Air France 447: When Humans and Systems See Different Reality
The Core Problem
Air France Flight 447 was in what should have been one of the most stable phases of...
Explore by domain
Aviation Risk Management
How risk is actually identified, assessed, and controlled in aviation operations.
Human Factors in Aviation
How operators make decisions—and how systems shape them.
Systems & Engineering
How aircraft systems are designed—and how complexity can quietly create risk.
Accident Case Studies
Deep breakdowns of real aviation accidents—what actually happened and why.
Aviation Risk Lab was created by an aviation safety engineer with over a decade of experience across military aviation, regulatory practice, and airspace safety.
That path — from safety design and initial airworthiness through continuing airworthiness, time as a regulator, and into airspace safety — shapes how this site approaches every topic. Not from a single vantage point, but from having sat at multiple points in the system.
The frameworks here draw on real experience applying ICAO standards, SMS, airworthiness regulation, and operational safety — across military and civil aviation environments.
Aviation Risk Lab exists because safety in complex systems deserves more than a checklist.
It deserves careful, honest thinking — and that’s what this is an attempt at.